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Where to Look, What to Ask? Frames of Reference for
Ethical Lobbyists
Thomas M. Susman*
The following examples set out situations where lobbyists may find
themselves confronted with deciding among different courses of action that
present ethical challenges. The purpose of this Essay is to provide background
and guidance on how the lobbyist might seek to answer that most important
question: What is the ethical thing to do?
Case 1: Larry Lobbyist represents a chemical company whose pesticide
has come under attack by environmental groups for potentially
damaging the ecosystem by killing non-target insects in surface and
subsurface waterways. Pressure is building in the Congress to ban the
chemical. Larry's brother, a chemist in Germany, has shared a report
with Larry providing scientific support for the allegations being made.
(a) Can Larry keep that informationfrom his client? (b) Can he continue
to assure members of Congress that the chemical is safe? (c) Can he
appear on news shows defending the safety of the chemical? (d) Would it
make a difference if the pesticide were the only chemical effective
againstmosquitoes carrying Denguefever?
Case 2: A staff member of the House Appropriations Committee has
suggested to Linda Lobbyist that Junior,the son of the chairman of that
Committee, might be very helpful in getting an earmark through for
Linda's client if he were added to the lobbying team. The proposalfor
the earmark has been passed over without action more than once. (a)
Should Linda bring this suggestion to her client's attention without
recommendation? (b) Should she urge her client to add Junior to the
team? (c) Should Junior's role be kept confidential by ensuring that his
work does not trigger public reporting requirements, or should it be
made public even if Juniordoes not meet those reporting requirements?
Case 3: Leonard Lobbyist represents two domestic clothing companies,
both of which are interested in keeping certain tariffs high on imports
from specific countries and in ensuring enforcement of wage and hour

* Mr. Susman is the Director of the American Bar Association's Governmental Affairs Office and coauthor of The Lobbying Manual. From 1981 to 2008, Mr. Susman was a partner in the Washington office of
Ropes & Gray, LLP, where his practice focused on legislative and regulatory issues. He also taught Lobbying
and Legislative Process as an Adjunct Professor at American University, Washington College of Law. Prior to
joining Ropes & Gray, LLP, Mr. Susman served as counsel to the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee and its
subcommittees and in the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legislative Counsel. The author expresses
sincere thanks to Holly Coy for her research assistance in the preparation of this Essay and emphasizes that the
views expressed here are his personal views and not those of the ABA.
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laws on textile workers in the Mariana Islands. Each client knows
Leonard represents the other as well, but since their interests are the
same, they are comfortable with the arrangement.Leonard works on an
hourly basis for one client and is on retainerfor the other. (a) Can
Leonard charge each client for the full time spent lobbying on the
common issues, effectively collecting twice for the same work? (b) What
must Leonard tell each client about his arrangementwith the other?
Case 4: Laura Lobbyist is given irrefutable evidence that Senator
Bigshot-thefamily- values conservative who chairs a key committee and
has single-handedly bottled up her client's bill for the past two
Congresses-has been having an illicit affair with a young woman. The
Senator is running for re-election; his prospects would be severely
damaged if the information in Laura's hands were made public. (a)
Should Laura let the Senator know she has that information? (b) Must
she ignore the information; after all, is it not relevant to the Senator's
official duties or her legislation? (c) Should she simply give the
information to her client and leave any further action to the client? (d)
Does the public have any right to know about this conduct? (e) Would it
matter if the young woman were underage or on the Senator's staff?
Case 5: Libby Lobbyist has been extremely successful raisingmoney for
members of Congress and every few months will usually have a bundle of
contributions from her energy industry clients and their colleagues.
Congressman Swingvote, a new member of an important and closely
divided subcommittee, has not announced a position on a key amendment
affecting that industry, and Libby has obtained substantial commitments
from her clients to give to Swingvote's campaign this cycle. Knowing
that it would maximize the impact of her lobbying message, Libby
considers delivering the checks in proximity to the vote on that
amendment. (a) Should she deliver the checks after the vote, to avoid any
appearance that she was trying to buy anything? (b) Can she deliver
them a week or two in advance of the vote? (c) Can she hand them over
at afundraiserthe evening before that vote?
Case 6: Loren Lobbyist served on the Senate Finance Committee stafffor
a decade and is recognized as a tax expert. His boutique lobbying
partnership specializes in lobbying on tax matters. Although he knows
there is usually only one Omnibus tax bill each year, Loren takes as
many clients as he and his partnercan handle, being careful, however, to
avoid taking on more than one client in the same industry. Some clients
pay Loren by the hour, some have him on retainer,and he has negotiated
a contingentfee or bonus arrangementwith afew clients. (a) Can Loren
fairly represent clients seeking similarobjectives (tax amendments) when
some offer bonuses for success, while others do not? (b) If Loren
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succeeds in getting a major amendment on the tax vehicle for one client,
but fails with a second, what is his obligation to the clientfor whom he
has not yet succeeded? Should he inform one client of the conflict
problem, withdrawfrom representation,or slow the bill so that there will
be a second chance for his other client? (c) Loren winds up sitting with
the Finance Committee chairman at a fundraising event; should he
mention his proposed amendment? Which one? More than one?
Each of the above hypothetical cases presents the same question for the
lobbyist: What is the ethical course of action? The cases may or may not present
legal questions as well. This Essay examines the sources where the lobbyist
might find answers to these legal and ethical questions. Some answers may be
found in laws, including rules with legal effect, while others may be found in
lawyers' rules of conduct or lobbyists' codes of ethics. For other answers, there
may be no objective guidance. When lobbyists confront these kinds of questions,
we must have an array of subjective resources to which we can turn for guidance.
Both the objective and subjective sources of guidance for ethical lobbying are
explored in this Essay.
I.

INTRODUCTION TO TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LOBBYING

Over the past few years the public, media, and Congress have given
increased attention to lobbying, lobbyists, and the role and influence they have in
shaping government programs and public policies; this should not be surprising
considering the exponential growth of the lobbying profession in Washington,
D.C. In 2008, there were around 15,000 registered federal lobbyists, an increase
of over 4,000 since 1998.' Their spending has increased along a similar
trajectory, closing the year with over $3 billion in lobbying expenses.2 While
many industries are facing a slowing economy, interest groups spent a record
$17.4 million in lobbying expenses each day Congress was in session in 2008, a
record 13.7 percent increase over 2007.'
Washington's fifteen thousand lobbyists 4 have substantial resources at their
disposal, and they are working hard to influence legislation and shape agency
regulations. Although concern about the influence of special interest groups is
often focused on campaign contributions, between 1998 and 2005, those groups
spent twice as much money lobbying public officials as they did on political

1. OpenSecrets.org, Lobbying Database, http://www.opensecrets.orgllobbyists/ (last visited Aug. 31,
2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (tracking the number of lobbyists and the total amount spent on
lobbying from 1998 to the present).
2. Id.
3. OpenSecrets.org, Capital Eye Blog: Washington Lobbying Grew to $3.2 Billion Last Year, Despite
Economy, http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2009/01/washington-lobbying-grew-to-32.html (last visited Aug.
31, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
4. Lobbying Database, supra note 1.
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contributions.5 Unlike campaign contributions, the intent of lobbying
expenditures is always clear: to influence policy outcomes for the benefit of the
client.
While this Essay focuses on federal lobbyists, statehouses are also frequented
by an increasing number of lobbyists, with nearly 40,000 lobbyists registering in
2006.6 In Florida and Illinois there are twelve lobbyists per legislator, and in New
York there are twenty-four.7
The overarching public perception is that lobbying is a corrupting force, and
the high visibility of the downfall of Jack Abramoff and those who fell with him,
plus scandals surrounding Congressmen Cunningham and Jefferson, lends
credibility to this perception. As summarized in a recent book on lobbying:
The havoc [that the Abramoff scandal] ultimately wreaked was
impressive: not only did it end Tom DeLay's career, but Congressman
Robert Ney of Ohio went to jail, Senator Conrad Burns of Montana and
Congressman Richard Pombo of California lost their seats, and
Congressman John Doolittle of California announced an unexpected
retirement.... By October 2008, five former congressional aides had
pleaded guilty to criminal charges; one former Bush administration
official was tried and convicted; three others pleaded guilty, one of
whom went to prison; Abramoff himself will spend years in jail.'
These highly visible public figures provide an encyclopedic agglomeration of
corrupt activities spanning less than a decade:
A. Abramoff
Jack Abramoff has gained notoriety as one of the most corrupt lobbyists that
Washington has seen in decades. The list of Abramoff's questionable, or
downright illegal, activities included soliciting millions of dollars in donations
from clients for a Republican political action committee, the U.S. Family

5. American Press Institute, New Online Database Details Federal Lobbying for Reporters, http://www.
americanpressinstitute.org/pages/resources/2005/04/new-online-database-details-fe/ (Apr. 7, 2005) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review). Recent scholarship reinforces the basis for this phenomenon, finding that
firms lobbying for a tax holiday on repatriated earnings had a return "in excess of $220 for every $1 spent on
lobbying, or 22,000%." Raquel Alexander, Susan Scholz & Stephen Mazza, Measuring Rates of Return for
Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Analysis Under the American Jobs Creation Act (Apr. 8, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
6. Sarah Laskow, State Lobbying Becomes Billion-DollarBusiness: At Least a Dozen States Revise
Laws in 2006, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Dec. 20, 2006, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.
aspx?aid=835 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
7. Ratio of Lobbyists to Legislators 2006, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Dec. 21, 2007, http://projects.
publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/chart.aspx?act=lobtoleg (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. ROBERT G. KAISER, So DAMN MUCH MONEY: THE TRIUMPH OF LOBBYING AND THE CORROSION OF
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 341 (2009).
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Network, which had ties to former U.S. Representative Tom DeLay.9 Abramoff s
clients included a number of Indian tribes, from whom he was charging
exorbitant fees for work he and his associates only claimed to be doing.' °
Abramoff's partner, Michael Scanlon, pleaded guilty to "conspiring to bribe
public officials" and agreed to pay restitution to the tune of $19 million."
Abramoff himself was sentenced to five years and ten months in prison for an
illegal purchase of casino cruise boats, the shortest possible term because of his
2
willingness to assist prosecutors in their investigation and his show of remorse.
In addition, Abramoff' s corrupt activities led to the convictions of a number
of his colleagues, as well as the government officials and congressional staff with
whom they associated. David Safavian was convicted twice for obstructing the
investigation into the now infamous 2002 golf trip to Scotland, in which
Abramoff financed a five-day vacation for Representative Ney, one of his
staffers, the head of the Christian Coalition, and Mr. Safavian. Representative
Ney admitted to the criminal charges brought against him and served seventeen
months in prison and at a halfway house. 3 Abramoff and a former partner, Adam
Kidan, were sentenced to five years in prison and were required to4pay restitution
of $21.7 million for their involvement in the casino boat scandals.
B. Cunningham
Former U.S. Representative Duke Cunningham (R-CA) pleaded guilty to
taking $2.4 million in bribes to direct defense contracts towards those funneling
him the illegal money.' As a member of the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee, he was in a position to secure $70 to $80 million in earmarks
from the House Intelligence Committee. 6 He ultimately pleaded guilty to tax
evasion, conspiracy to commit bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud, for which he

9.

R. Jeffrey Smith, The DeLay-Abramoff Money Trail, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2005, available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/30/AR2005123001480.html.
10. Id.
11. Former DeLay Aide Pleads Guilty in Bribe Charge, A.P., Dec. 22, 2005, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/10143314/.
12. Peter Whoriskey & William Branigin, Abramoffls Sentencedfor Casino Boat Fraud, WASH. POST,
Mar. 30, 2006, at A01, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlcontent/articlel2006/10/13/
AR2006101300740.html.
13. Joselyn King, Ney's Sentence Ends Saturday, MOBILE INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 12, 2008, availableat
http://www.news-register.net/page/content.detail/id/512792.html.
14. Whoriskey & Branigin, supra note 12; Susan Schmidt, Abramoffls to Begin Sentence Today, WASH.
POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A06, available at http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dyn/contentlarticle/2006/11/14/
AR2006111400993.html.
15. Randal C. Archibold, Ex-Congressman Gets 8-Year Term in Bribery Case, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4,
2006, at A10, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E01ElD91431F937A35750
COA9609C8B63.
16. H.R. COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR THE CUNNINGHAM INQUIRY:
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2006), available at http://www.house.gov/appsllist/press/ca36-harmanlreport.pdf (on
file with the McGeorge Law Review).

2009 / Frames of Reference for Ethical Lobbyists
was sentenced to serve eight years in prison and pay $1.8 million in restitution.'7
This is the longest sentence ever given to a former Member of Congress.'8
As with Abramoff, others were prosecuted in association with the
Cunningham scandal.' 9 Brent Wilkes, the owner of Automated Document
Conversion Systems, Inc., was convicted in 2008 for paying Cunningham to steer
contracts to his defense contracting company. He was ultimately sentenced to
twelve years in prison.' ° Mitchell Wade was sentenced to two and a half years
after connections were revealed between contracts given to his defense
contracting firm, MZM, and the bribes he gave to Cunningham.2 ' In total, Wade
spent roughly $1.8 million on Cunningham in combined cash and gifts between
2001 and 2005.22
C. DeLay
Former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay was forced out of politics
because of scandals relating to both campaign finance and lobbying activities. In
2005, he was indicted on charges of conspiring to violate campaign finance laws
by funneling corporate funds to elections at the state level. 23 After the indictment,
he withdrew from the 2006 election. 24 He was also swept into the Abramoff
scandal for accepting gifts from Abramoff, including airfare for the infamous
2002 golfing trip to Scotland, and he was criticized for then voting on legislation
supporting the positions of Abramoff's clients.25
Congress responded to these scandals with the Honest Leadership and Open
Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA).26 Congress required all lobbyists to certify
semiannually that they had read and were familiar with House and Senate gift

17. Archibold, supra note 15.
18. Crooked Congressman Going to Prison, CNN, Mar. 3, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/
LAW/3/03/cunningham.sentenced/index.html (on filewith the McGeorge Law Review) (quoting Assistant
U.S. Attorney Jason Forge).
19. See, e.g., John Bresnahan, Duke Briber Gets 12 Year Prison Sentence, CBS NEWS, Feb. 19, 2008,
http://www.cbsnews.comstories/2008/02/l9/politics/politico/thecrypt/main3849757.shtm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).

20.

Id.

21.

Del Quentin Wilber, Ex-Contractor Gets 2 1/2 Years in Prison in Cunningham Case, WASH. POST,

Dec. 16, 2008, at A03, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/12/15/
AR2008121501410.html.
22. Id.
23. R. Jeffrey Smith, DeLay Indicted in Texas Finance Probe, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 2005, at A01,
availableat http://www.washingtonpost.conmwp-dyn/content/article/2005/09/28/AR200509280027.htm.

24. See Carl Hulse, DeLay Is Quitting Race and House, Officials Report, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2006,
availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/04/washington/04delay.htm.
25. R. Jeffrey Smith, DeLay Airfare Was Charged to Lobbyist's Credit Card, WASH. POST, Apr. 4,
2005, at A01, availableat http://www.washingtonpost.comlwp-dynlarticles/A 12416-2005Apr23.html.
26. Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat.
735.

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 41
21

and travel rules and had not knowingly violated any of the provisions.
Additionally, HLOGA made any knowing violation a criminal offense 28 and
recommended ethics training for federally registered lobbyists. 9 One of the vocal
proponents for toughening the lobbying reform proposals was then-Senator
Barack Obama.3 °
It was little wonder, then, that both presidential candidates in 2008 advocated
for limiting the roles of lobbyists in their campaigns and spoke out critically
about how lobbyists infected the legislative process.3 In his transition period,
President-elect Obama insisted on limiting the areas of participation by lobbyists,
and on the first full day of his term, the President issued an Executive Order
imposing additional revolving-door restrictions on lobbyists, constraining their
ability to work in agencies they had previously lobbied.32 Likewise, the day after
the new Treasury Secretary was confirmed, his Department issued a release
forbidding lobbying by organizations that had received federal bailout funds.33
This was followed by a March 2009 White House Memorandum directing: "An
executive department or agency official shall not consider the view of a
[registered]

lobbyist

.

.

.

concerning

particular projects,

applications, or

applicants for funding under the Recovery Act unless such views are in
writing. 34
The lobbying community, in addition to defending itself from the incessant
incoming criticism, initially supported many of the reforms and emphasized its

27. Id. § 203(a) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 1604(d)(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009)).
28. Id. § 211 (a) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. § 1606(b) (West Supp. 2009)).
29. Id. § 214(1), (2)(B) ("It is the sense of the Congress that ... the lobbying community should develop
proposals for multiple self-regulatory organizations which could . . . provide training for the lobbying
community on law, ethics, reporting requirements, and disclosure requirements.").
30. See Bara Vaida, Being Mr. Clean, NAT'L J., July 5, 2008, available at http://www.nationaljournal.
com/njmagazine/nj_20080705_9136.php.
31. David Mattingly & Joe Johns, Obama, McCain Both Have Lobbyist Ties, CNNPoLITICS.COM, July
29, 2008, http:/Iwww.cnn.com2008/POLITICS/O7/2911obbyists/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
32. Exec. Order No. 13,490, 74 Fed. Reg. 4673 (Jan. 21, 2009) (entitled "Ethics Commitments by
Executive Branch Personnel").
33. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treas., Treasury Secretary Opens Term Opens [sic] with New Rules to
Bolster Transparency, Limit Lobbyist Influence in Federal Investment Decisions, Jan. 27, 2009, available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/tg02.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) ("The Treasury
Department will implement safeguards to prevent lobbyist influence over the [Emergency Economic
Stabilization Act] program, including restricting contacts with lobbyists in connection with applications for, or
disbursements of, EESA funds.").
34. Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and
Agencies: Ensuring Responsible Spending of Recovery Act Funds § 3(a) (Mar. 20, 2009), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/Memorandum-for-the-Heads-of-Executive-Departments-and
Agencies-3-20-09/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). The written comments must be made available to
the public online within three business days of receipt. Id. § 3(c). These rules were revised and expanded by the
White House in May. Jesse Lee, Update on Recovery Act Lobbying Rules: New Limits on Special Interest
Influence, The White House, The Briefing Room: The Blog, May 29, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/
Update-on-Recovery-Act-Lobbying-Rules-New-Limits-on-Special-Interest-Influence/ (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review).
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commitment to ethics training and ethical lobbying.35 But these reform efforts
mainly focused on the applicable rules (relevant federal laws and congressional
rules).
Most of my writings on the subject of lobbying and lobbyists have also
focused on rules: what they are and what they should be. The anchor for this
body of work is the American Bar Association's definitive Lobbying Manual, a
collection of extensive and exhaustive chapters covering the laws governing
lobbyists, their activities, and how to comply with those laws.36 In a series of
articles and essays, I also explored issues relating to reciprocity, the common
good, campaign finance, and needed changes to the federal lobbying laws.37 In an
article addressing contingent fee lobbying, my co-author and I not only examined
the laws applicable to contingent fee lobbying and recommended changes to
those laws, but also explored the ethical issues implicated by the practice in the
absence of applicable laws.38

Without a doubt, looking beyond legal rules-to codes, principles, standards,
and various subjective guideposts for pointing the lobbyist toward ethical
actions-presents a more challenging task. In the pages below, the first stop on
my journey will be a review of the laws governing lobbyists and lobbying, for
they are surely important to ethical decision-making and are a major
preoccupation of the practicing lobbyist. My next stop will be the principles that
can help guide ethical decisions by lobbyists (including lawyer-lobbyists), with a
focus on codes of ethics. I will end in more uncertain terrain, examining how
lobbyists might go about seeking answers to questions and solving ethical
dilemmas that are not mandated by laws or guided by rules or clear principles.
II. LAWS GOVERNING LOBBYISTS
Compliance with relevant laws is the first-and often the most-important
mandate for ethical lobbying. It must be repeated, however, that, at least outside
the lobbying arena, violation of the law does not necessarily define unethical
conduct. In fact, adherence to high moral principles may require violation of the
laws. The classic examples, of course, are the harboring of Jews in Nazi
35. For a collection of statements regarding all aspects of the lobbying profession, see the ALL website.
American League of Lobbyists, Lobby Reform Activities, http://www.alldc.org/publicresources/
lobbyreformactivities.cfm (last visited Aug. 31, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
36.

THE LOBBYING MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LOBBYING LAW AND PRACTICE

(William V. Luneburg, Thomas M. Susman & Rebecca H. Gordon eds., 4th ed. 2009) [hereinafter THE
LOBBYING MANUAL].

37. See, e.g., Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay on Ethical Lobbying,
Campaign Contributions,Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 10 (2008); William V.
Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman, Lobbying Disclosure:A Recipe for Reform, 33 J. LEGIS. 32 (2006); Thomas
M. Susman, Lobbying in the 21st Century-Reciprocity and the Need for Reform, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 737
(2006) [hereinafter Susman, 21st Century].
38. Thomas M. Susman & Margaret H. Martin, Contingent Fee Lobbying: Inflaming Avarice or
FacilitatingConstitutionalRights?, 31 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 312 (2007).
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Germany and the serving of black people at restaurants in the segregated South.
So also, compliance with the law does not always define ethical conduct. A
closer-to-home example would be the timing of legal campaign contributions to
coincide with key committee votes by the recipients of those contributions.
States have many and varied laws governing lobbyists and lobbying, 9 but for
simplicity I will focus here on federal laws. A review of the key laws with which
federal lobbyists must comply must begin with those federal criminal statutes
that apply more broadly, but have often been used to convict corrupt lobbyists.
1. Bribery: The bribery statute requires a showing that something of
value was corruptly given, offered, or promised to a public official
with the intent "to influence any official act" or that a public official
corruptly demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to receive
or accept something of value "in return for ...
the performance of any official act."4

being influenced in

2. Illegal Gratuities: The illegal gratuity provision requires a showing
that something of value was given, offered, or promised to a public
official or demanded, sought, received, accepted, or agreed to be
received or accepted by a public official "for or because of any
official act performed or to be performed by such public official.'
3. Compensation for Representational Services: 18 U.S.C. § 203
prohibits receipt by, or payment to, a federal employee of
compensation for certain representational assistance in matters "in
which the42 United States is a party or has a direct and substantial
interest.,
4. Supplementation of Salary: A federal employee is prohibited from
receiving-and anyone other than a state, county, or municipal
treasury is prohibited from giving-anything of value to supplement
the federal employee's government salary.43

39. For access to a database with the applicable laws to different states, see the National Conference of
State Legislatures website. National Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/Legislatures
Elections/Ethics/StatesLegislativeEthicsandLobbyingLawstabid/I5352/Default.aspx
(last visited Aug. 31,
2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
40. 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)-(2) (2006) (stating that the criminal punishment is a fine not to exceed "three
times the monetary equivalent of the thing of value .... [imprisonment] for not more than fifteen years, or
both"). As an example, see Plea Agreement at 1-2, United States v. Abramoff, No. CR-06-001 (D.D.C. Jan. 3,
2006). Abramoff was charged under Count One with conspiracy to violate the bribery proscription of 18 U.S.C.
§ 201(b), as well as other sections of the same title.
41. 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l)(A); see, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398,
404-05 (1999) (providing that the Government must prove the causal nexus between the thing of value and the
"official act" and noting that merely demonstrating that a gratuity was given to a public official is insufficient
for liability under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(l)(A)).
42. 18 U.S.C. § 203(a)(1) (2006).
43. Id. § 209(a); see, e.g., Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Clinton, 880 F. Supp. 1, 5 n.3 (D.D.C. 1995) (refusing
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5.

Deprivation of Honest Services: 18 U.S.C. § 1346 criminalizes the
use of a "scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible right
of honest services."" Courts have held that this section, which
codifies the common law theory of "intangible rights," applies to
mail and wire fraud.45

6. Mail or Wire Fraud: It is a crime to use "wire, radio, or television
communication," the United States Postal Service, or any other
interstate carrier to defraud or to obtain "money or property by
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises. 46
7.

False Reporting: Anyone who "knowingly and willfully-(1)
falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a
material fact; (2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent
statement or representation; or (3) makes or uses any false writing or
document knowing the same to contain any materially false,
fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry" will be criminally liable
and subject to criminal punishments, including fines and
47
imprisonment.

Although this Essay focuses on the federal establishment for convenience,
we must always keep in mind that each state has its own panoply of laws
regulating lobbyists and lobbying activities. 48 The federal laws have proved
adequate to ensure that egregious conduct by lobbyists such as Jack Abramoff
can be punished.4 9 But they are not the only laws with which lobbyists must
comply. The broadest statute covering federal lobbyists is the Lobbying
Disclosure Act of 1995 (LDA).5 ° The LDA defines "lobbyist"'" and "lobbying

to address an alleged violation of section 209(a) in private litigation because the section does not provide a
private right of action).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
45. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Sawyer, 74 F. Supp. 2d 88, 98 n.13 (D. Mass. 1999) (explaining the
codification of the common law theory of "intangible right to honest government services" and its application to
mail fraud).
46. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006); 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 2009); see, e.g., United States v.
Bereano, 161 F.3d 3 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision) (text of opinion available at WL 553445), cert.
denied, 526 U.S. 1130 (1999).
47. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (2006); see, e.g., United States v. Safavian, 528 F.3d 957, 963 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(providing a factual illustration and application of § 1001(a)(1)).
48. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 39.
49. See Whoriskey & Branigin, supra note 12.
50. Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-65, 109 Stat. 691 (codified as amended in 2
U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612; scattered sections of 22 U.S.C. §§ 611, 621; 18 U.S.C. § 207; and 5 U.S.C. § 3304
(2006)).
51. Id. § 3(10) ("The term 'lobbyist' means any individual who is employed or retained by a client for
financial or other compensation for services that include more than one lobbying contact, other than an
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activities 5 2 and requires lobbyists who engage in a certain level of lobbying,
subject to numerous exceptions, to register with the Clerk of the House of
Representatives and Secretary of the Senate.53 The lobbyists must also report
quarterly on their clients, their revenues (or, in the case of firms employing
lobbyists, expenditures), issues being lobbied, and agencies or Houses of
Congress lobbied.54 While far from perfect,55 this legislation, as strengthened by
the HLOGA,56 opens a significant window of transparency on federal lobbyists
and their lobbying activities.
In addition to the basic lobbying disclosure scheme put in place by the LDA,
other federal regulations and statutes govern or require disclosures by lobbyists.
Some examples include:
1. Foreign Agents Registration Act: This statute, enacted in 1938,

requires that individuals lobbying on behalf of foreign countries
register their foreign affiliations with the United States Department
of Justice prior to conducting any lobbying activities.57
2. Byrd Amendment: The Amendment stipulates that funds appropriated
by Congress cannot be used to lobby for any federal awards and
requires disclosure by individuals who use non-appropriated funds to
pay lobbyists to obtain federal contracts." It applies to all recipients
of funds and subcontractors at all levels5 9
3.

Federal Acquisition Regulations: The

regulations

affect

the

relationships between government agencies and private businesses
by setting limitations on the reimbursement of contractors' lobbying
expenditures. 0
individual whose lobbying activities constitute less than 20 percent of the time engaged in the services provided
by such individual to that client over a six month period.").
52. Id. § 3(7) ("The term 'lobbying activities' means lobbying contacts and efforts in support of such
contacts, including preparation and planning activities, research and other background work that is intended, at
the time it is performed, for use in contacts, and coordination with the lobbying activities of others.").
53. Id. § 4(a)(l), (3) (providing the general rule requiring lobbyists to register with the Secretary and the
Clerk and then providing the exceptions to the registration requirements).
54. Id. § 4(b).
55. See generally Luneburg & Susman, supra note 37; William V. Luneburg, The Evolution of Federal
Lobbying Regulation: Where We Are Now and Where We Should Be Going, 41 MCGEORGE L. REV. 85 (2009).

56.

Honest Leadership and Open Government Act of 2007 (HLOGA), Pub. L. No. 110-81, 121 Stat.

735.
57. Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, ch. 327, 52 Stat. 631 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. §§
611-621 (2006)); see also Ronald I. Meltzer, Foreign Agents Registration Act, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL,
supra note 36, at 307-08.
58. Byrd Amendment, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 319, 103 Stat. 750 (1989) (codified as amended at 13
U.S.C. § 1352 (2006)); see also Thomas M. Susman, The Byrd Amendment, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 36, at 349-50.
59. Id.
60. 48 C.F.R. § 31.205-22 (2008); see also Thomas M. Susman, Federal Acquisition Regulation
Governing Lobbying, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 36, at 365.
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4. Antitrust Consent Decree Lobbying Disclosure Requirements: These
regulations, included in the 1974 Antitrust Procedures and Penalties
Act (Tunney Act), were designed to increase transparency of
procedures surrounding antitrust settlements issued via consent
decree.6' In order to achieve this goal, defendants are required to
disclose "all written or oral communications ...with any officer or
employee of the United States. 62
5.

Tax Laws: There are several tax laws applicable to and restricting
lobbying expenses. Businesses may not deduct lobbying expenses
under the Internal Revenue Code and nonprofit organizations are
61
restricted in how much they may spend on lobbying.

Taken together, this rather substantial body of laws governing lobbying has
generally, despite occasional anecdotal evidence to the contrary, 64 had salutary
results: lobbying in Washington, D.C., in the twenty-first century is the most
transparent and honest lobbying-both in our own history and in the world
today. 65 Nonetheless, this network of laws does not provide the answers to most
of the ethical questions raised by the conduct described in the hypothetical cases
that began this Essay. We are assisted in our search for answers to these
questions by principles that might guide us-principles that go beyond the rules
and laws described above.
III. PRINCIPLES GUIDING ETHICAL LOBBYING
Rules of conduct and codes of ethics often provide quite detailed roadmaps
to assist the lobbyist in traversing ethically dangerous terrain. Some of these
codes look like laws, but they are distinguishable because they are largely not
enforceable.66 Others may be enforced through the disciplinary processes of
professional organizations.67

61. H.R. Rep. No. 93-1463 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.; see United States v. AT&T Co.,
552 F. Supp. 131, 148-49 (D.D.C. 1982), affid, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
62. Antitrust Procedures and Penalties (Tunney) Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974) (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 16(a)-(i) (2006)); see also Thomas M. Susman, Antitrust Consent Decree (Tunney
Act) Lobbying, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 36, at 323-24.
63. See generally Timothy W. Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue Code Limitations on
Deductibility of Lobbying Expenses by Businesses and Trade Associations, in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra
note 36, at 377; Timothy W. Jenkins & A.L. (Lorry) Spitzer, Internal Revenue Code Limitations on Lobbying by
Tax-Exempt Organizations,in THE LOBBYING MANUAL, supra note 36, at 393.
64. Some would hardly call the Abramoff scandal anecdotal, but it was confined to the machinations of
a single lobbyist and others implicated in his activities.
65. See Susman, 21st Century, supra note 37, at 742-44.
66. AM. LEAGUE OF LOBBYISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (2000), available at http://www.alldc.
org/ethicscode.cfm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
67. E.g., AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL RULES OF PROF. CONDUCT (2002), available at http://www.
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One of the great grandfathers of ethics -codes is, of course, the Ten
Commandments. Some of the proscriptions in this code, as in others, have been
embodied in laws, such as the prohibitions against murder and theft. Others
remain aspirational: honoring one's father and mother and refraining from
coveting a neighbor's wife or possessions. That they have remained viable for
thousands of years suggests the power of even unenforced codes.
Lawyers know about codes of conduct.68 Our professional codes-part rule,
part principle-are in many ways enforceable. A violator runs the risk of losing
her license, being reprimanded, or being forced to withdraw from representing a
major client. But the codes also provide important principles governing our
conduct and our relationships with both clients and institutions. While these rules
after the
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, most have modeled their rules
69
Conduct.
Professional
of
Rules
Model
Association's
Bar
American
A lawyer/lobbyist can shed his lawyerly responsibilities by opting out of the
rules, but there is a high threshold for doing so. The lobbying services provided
must be kept separate and distinct from any law-related services, and the lawyer
must ensure that the lobbying client fully understands that only lobbying, not
legal, services are being provided and that there are practical implications to this
distinction, including the non-applicability of confidentiality, conflict-of-interest,
and fee-sharing constraints.70
The lawyer who also lobbies is not free from the constraints, for example,
imposed by the duty of confidentiality and the requirement that conflicts of
interest be avoided. There is, however, a rich reservoir of guidance and opinions,
from both the ABA 7 and each jurisdiction, to assist the lawyer/lobbyist in
navigating the applicable rules. 3

abanet.org/cpr/mrpc/mrpctoc.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Links to Other Legal
Ethics and Professional Responsibility Pages, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/links.html#States (last visited Aug. 31,
2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing links to the ethics codes and regulations across
different state jurisdictions).
70. See Ronald D. Gifford, The Ethical Responsibilities of a Lawyer-Lobbyist, in THE LOBBYING
MANUAL: A COMPLETE GUIDE TO FEDERAL LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS AND LOBBYISTS 487 (William V.
Luneburg & Thomas M. Susman eds., 3d ed. 2005).
71. See, e.g., American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Publications,
http://www.abanet.org/cprlpubs/home.htm (last visited May 24, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law
Review).
72. See American Bar Association, Center for Professional Responsibility, Directory of Lawyer
Disciplinary Agencies, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/regulation/directory.pdf (last visited May 24, 2009) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review) (listing the ethics enforcement bodies and their contact information for each
state jurisdiction).
73. The ABA also provides answers to lawyers' questions on ethics. American Bar Association, Center
for Professional Responsibility, http://www.abanet.org/cpr/ethicsearch/home.html (last visited May 24, 2009)
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Lobbyists who are not lawyers have codes of ethics, too. The best-known
code in Washington is that of the American League of Lobbyists (ALL). The
ALL Code, developed in 2000, sets out nine guidelines and standards designed to
assist lobbyists in acting in the "highest ethical and moral manner."75 These
guidelines deal with: honesty and integrity; compliance with applicable laws,
regulations, and rules; professionalism; conflicts of interest; due diligence and
best efforts; compensation and engagement terms; confidentiality; public
education; and duty to governmental institutions. They are sufficiently general
to provide worthwhile practical guidance for the working lobbyist; however, they
avoid entirely any mention of the •proper
role or dangers of campaign
• 77
contributions and other campaign activities.
A comprehensive code of ethics for lobbyists emerged from a project of the
Woodstock Theological Center. The Principles for the Ethical Conduct of
78 were developed specifically to provide practical guidance
Lobbying (Principles)
for lobbyists, and they do in many respects. The Woodstock Principles have
seven sections addressing: lobbying and the common good; lobbyist-client
relationships; lobbyist-policymaker relationships; lobbyists and shapers of public
opinion; conflicts of interest; lobbying strategies and tactics; and the obligation to
preserve the integrity of the lobbying profession. 9 I have elsewhere identified
two concerns about these Principles-onebased on omission and one based on
commission.
As with the ALL Code, the Principles"do not address in any helpful way the'
troubling relationship between financing political campaigns and lobbying."'
Although the authors of the Principles often refer "to the role of money in
bringing about decline in respect for government,"82
the [Principles] themselves only say a couple of things on this subject:
that "financing political campaigns should not compromise elected
officials or undermine public trust in their independence and
74.

AM. LEAGUE OF LOBBYISTS, CODE OF ETHICS (2000), available at http://www.alldc.org/ethicscode.

cfm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
75.

Id.

76.

Id. at arts. I-IX.

77.

Am. Soc'y of Ass'n Executives, Association Management (Sept. 1, 1997). Similar guidance is

contained in the Guidelines for Association Lobbyists, id., which is modeled after the ALL Code.
78.

WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL CTR., PRINCIPLES FOR THE ETHICAL CONDUCT OF LOBBYING: "THE

WOODSTOCK PRINCIPLES" (2002), available at http://woodstock.georgetown.edu/resources/papers/papersPrinciples-for-Ethical-Lobbying.html [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]; see also WOODSTOCK THEOLOGICAL CENTER,
THE ETHICS OF LOBBYING: ORGANIZED INTERESTS, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE COMMON GOOD 81 (2002)

[hereinafter ETHICS OF LOBBYING].
79.

PRINCIPLES, supra note 78.

80. Thomas Susman, Lobbying: Ethical, Though Not Bound by the Common Good, Presentation at The
Ethics of Lobbying: Organized Interests, Political Power, and the Common Good, A Woodstock Forum (Oct.
24, 2002), in WOODSTOCK REPORT NO. 72 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
81.

Id.

82.

E.g., ETHICS OF LOBBYING, supra note 78, at 2.
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impartiality,"[ 3 ] [principle 1], and that "fund-raising efforts or campaign
contributions" should not be "linked to support for a particular policy
objective" [principle 3(f)].84
I agree with both points, but they clearly do not say enough.
Regarding commission, the first and highest Principleis that "[t]he pursuit of
lobbying must take into account the common good, not merely a particular
client's interest narrowly considered., 85 As I noted previously:
This presumes that there is a knowable and timeless "common good" that
should not just be considered, but should be given special attention,
perhaps even primacy, in lobbying activities. It would be too easy to say
that, as a lawyer, I am bound by the codes and canons that require my
allegiance to clients first and foremost, even if there may be some
societal interest that must take second chair.
I have trouble with the concept that there is an immutable
common good that provides a measurable guidepost for lobbying
activity. I think it fair to propose that members of Congress remain
faithful to the goal of promoting the common good, as well as the wellbeing of a constituency. But is it my job, as a lobbyist, to determine
whether the common good is best served by cheap power provided by
hydroelectric plants that can make electricity more readily available to
the poor, or by [not building such plants and thereby] maintaining [freeflowing rivers for the generations that follow us]? I think [that is]
Congress's role, not [the lobbyist's].
Is the common good measured in the here and now, or looking only
to the future? A short-term view would mean much environmental
protection legislation that raises costs and eliminates jobs to protect a
view or recreation or a species would have to be opposed. Also, the
common good can change in the long run. Societies believed slavery to
be beneficial to the common good for 2,000 years; since slaves [were
not] citizens, their interests were not relevant.
Finally, what do we do with strong opposing moral claims? Is the
common good better served by protecting the life 8of
an unborn child or
6
advancing the health and well-being of the mother?
Perhaps it is unfortunate, but I do not see pursuit of the common good as
providing a useful ethical guidepost for lobbyists. While lobbyists identify with

83.
84.
85.
86.

See PRINCIPLES, supranote 78.
Id.
Id.
Susman, supra note 80.
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their clients' and employers' issues, some studies suggest that they also pursue
independent agendas.87 This may be explained in part by an interest in pursuing
the common good, despite their clients' interests.
There are other codes applicable to lobbyists in other jurisdictions. Some
state lobbying associations have their own codes of ethics."s In addition, states
often adopt legislation regulating the contacts between lobbyists and public
officials. 89 Forty states have created ethics committees, most of which oversee the
implementation of ethics regulations applicable to legislators.90 These committees
have taken many forms: some are created in an ad hoc fashion by the legislature;
some are joint committees overseeing both chambers; others are standing
committees. 9' All hear complaints and have some authority to investigate and
prosecute ethics violations. 92
Lobbyists in Canada 93 and Quebec 94 are bound by their own Lobbying Code
of Ethics, which is enforced by the Office of the Commissioner of Lobbying.
Lobbying associations in the European Union have a general code, the Society of
European Affairs Professionals' Code of Ethics, which applies to their
members.95

These ethics codes are valuable even when not part of an enforcement
regime. "A code of ethics can establish community standards" and thereby define
behavior expected by clients and members of legislatures. 96 "A lobbyist's success
and reputation will turn on compliance with those standards. 97 A code of ethics
not only informs the public (and lobbying clients) of the values of the group
adhering to that code, but it also informs individual members of the lobbying

87. See generally Rogan Kersh, State Autonomy & Civil Society: The Lobbyist Connection, 14 CRITICAL
REV. 237 (2000).
88. National Conference of State Legislatures, Ethics: Table of States and Territories-State Ethics
Committees, http://www.ncsl.org/programs/ethics/ethicscommittees.htm (last visited May 24, 2009) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
89. Leah Rush & David Jimenez, States Outpace Congress in Upgrading Lobbying Laws, CTR. FOR
PUB. INTEGRITY, Mar. 1, 2006, http://projects.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/report.aspx?aid=781 (on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
90. Id.
91. National Conference of State Legislatures, supra note 88.
92. Id.
93.

LOBBYISTS' CODE OF ETHICS, ANNUAL REPORT (2004), available at http://www.ocl-cal.gc.ca/

eic/site/lobbyist-lobbyiste I .nsf/eng/nxOO028.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
94.

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LOBBYISTS (2002), available at http://www2.publicationsduquebec.gouv.

qc.ca/dynamicSearch/telecharge.php?type=3&file=/TI"11_011/11_01IR0_2_A.HTM (on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
95. E.g., Soc'y of Eur. Affairs Prof'ls, Code of Conduct, available at http://www.seap.be/html/code.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see generally Craig Holman & Thomas
Susman, Self-Regulation and Regulation of the Lobbying Profession (May 5,2009) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Paris, France and with the
McGeorge Law Review).
96. Susman, supra note 80.
97. Id.
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community of what is expected of them. 9 Even in the absence of an enforcement
mechanism, "a combination of adverse media coverage and peer condemnation
will usually provide sufficient motivation for compliance." 99 Competitive market
forces may also influence the ethics of lobbyists,' °° but incomplete information by
clients and employers often impedes the efficacy of these forces.
Before turning from the subject of principles, as embodied in rules of
conduct and ethics codes, I would point the reader to the very valuable sources of
ethical guidance provided by organizations, boards, committees, and the like, that
have either assumed the role or been empowered with the authority to interpret
the codes and relevant laws. These include the Office of Government Ethics; the
House of Representatives Committee on Standards of Conduct; the Senate Ethics
Committee; state bar counsels and the ABA Center for Professional
Responsibility; state ethics commissions; and the Office of the Commissioner of
Lobbying of Canada.'0
We now depart the realms of rules, laws, ethics codes, and principles to enter
more subjective territory. Yet this is often where the practicing lobbyist finds
herself. Ethics codes are often so general in their guidance that they can be
entirely unhelpful in specific situations or contradictory in some of their
applications to concrete cases. Where, then, do we look when seeking answers to
some of the questions posed at the beginning of this Essay?
IV. ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING BEYOND CODES

Being without laws or codes to guide us does not mean that a lobbyist is
rudderless. This final section of my Essay first reviews a sampling of frameworks
for ethical decision-making offered by some well-known authorities in the field. I
then conclude by offering some additional, perhaps more subjective, and
certainly less well-developed, approaches to answering ethical questions that
lobbyists may have.

Thomas M. Susman, Codes of Ethical Conduct for Lobbyists, in NATIONAL CONF. OF STATE
142 (2002).
99. Susman, supra note 80.
100. PMA Group, which rose to prominence in the Washington lobbying community as a master of
obtaining earmarks for clients, met an ignominious demise and closed its doors when public exposure of
questionable activities combined with an FBI investigation. David Kirkpatrick & Charlie Savage, Star Lobbyist
Closes Shop Amid F.B.I. Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2009, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.
com2009/03/30/us/politics/30pma.html.
101. It is perhaps the appropriate time to point out that the author has for over a decade been Ethics
Committee Chair of the American League of Lobbyists and, in that role, has voluntarily provided nonbinding
guidance to members with questions on ethics.
98.

LEGISLATURES, THE STATE OF STATE LEGISLATIVE ETHICS
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A.

Contemporary Frameworksfor Resolving Ethical Challenges
1.

Ethics Institute

Rushworth Kidder is a former journalist, an author, and the founder of the
Institute for Global Ethics, a nonprofit organization devoted to ethics
education.' °2 His recent books, How Good People Make Tough Choices and
Moral Courage, have guided numerous individuals and organizations in making
ethical decisions while operating in treacherous business climates.0 3
Kidder argues that tough choices are not questions of right versus wrong, but
rather, of right versus right.' ° These are situations in which there are two right
options, but no clear solution.0 5 Kidder presents a number of ethical paradigm
pairs, one of which is usually dominant in any ethical dilemma. These paradigms
include truth versus loyalty, individual versus community, short-term versus
long-term, and justice versus mercy.' 6 One of the tools Kidder suggests using is a
checklist to ensure ethical decision-making. Some highlights include checking to
see if a problem is a right-versus-wrong or a right-versus-right dilemma.' 7 The
first is a moral issue, while the second falls into the ethical category.' 0 Kidder
identifies three principles that can be applied to ethical dilemmas: an end-based
approach, a rule-based approach, and a care-based approach.' °9
Each of these principles provides a different framework within which a
solution to the ethical decision may be made. The end-based approach centers on
the greatest good for the greatest number. The rule-based approach is based on
the Golden Rule and suggests doing to others what one would want done to
himself."0 Finally, the care-based approach advocates decision-making based on
one's own understanding of principles.

102.

Institute for Global Ethics, http://www.globalethics.org/staff.php (last visited May 29, 2009) (on

file with the McGeorge Law Review).
103. RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, How GOOD PEOPLE MAKE TOUGH CHOICES (William Morrow 1995);
RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, MORAL COURAGE (2005); Washington Speakers Bureau, Rushworth Kidder,

http://www.washingtonspeakers.com/speakers/speaker.cfm?Speakerld=4293 (last visited May 29, 2009) (on file
with the McGeorge Law Review).
104. Washington Speakers Bureau, Rushworth Kidder, http://www.washingtonspeakers.comspeakers/
speaker.cfm?Speakerld=4293 (last visited May 29, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); Terry J. van
der Werf, Global Future Report, May 18, 1998, www.globalfuture.com/book-kidder.htm (on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (reviewing RUSHWORTH M. KIDDER, How GOOD PEOPLE MAKE TOUGH CHOICES

(William Morrow 1995)).
105. Terry J. van der Werf, Global Future Report, May 18, 1998, www.globalfuture.com/bookkidder.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (reviewing RUSHWORTH KIDDER, How GOOD PEOPLE
MAKE TOUGH CHOICES (William Morrow 1995)).

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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2. Markkula Center"'
The Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, located at Santa Clara University,
was established to promote and encourage ethical education and decision-making
in various sectors." 2 The Center's framework for ethical decision-making
involves asking a number of questions while processing the dilemma through
five different approaches: utilitarian, rights-based, fairness or justice, common
good, and virtuous."3 Each approach explores a different angle of the available
solutions. For example, the utilitarian approach attempts to maximize the good
while keeping bad consequences to a minimum, whereas the rights-based
that the appropriate action is
approach is based on the philosophical argument
4
individuals."
of
rights
the
respects
that which
Decisions should be made after consideration is given to all the approaches,
at which point the individual is asked to consider explaining the decision on
television." 5 This is intended to test the visceral reaction to one's decision and
whether it would bear public scrutiny.1 6 However, this is not a simple process
(nor a reliable one). Problems arise because the values upheld in each of these
approaches are not universal, and conflicts emerge over the practical meaning of
philosophical concepts such as the "common good." ' 7 Though the approaches
may guide decisions about what is ethical, the final answers for each may vary
greatly. But the Markkula Center focuses on the information produced by trying
on each approach for size. ' 8 With this wealth of information, ethical decision
making becomes a more manageable process.
3. Michael Josephson
The Joseph and Edna Josephson Institute of Ethics was created to improve
the ethical quality of society." 9 Founded in 1987 by Michael Josephson in honor
of his parents, the mission of the Institute is to improve the ethical quality of
society by changing personal and organizational decision-making and behavior. 2 °

111. Santa Clara University, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/
decision/framework.html (last visited May 29, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
112. Santa Clara University, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, About the Center, http://www.
scu.edu/ethics/about/ (last visited May 29, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
113. Santa Clara University, Markkula Center for Applied Ethics, www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/
decision/framework.html (last visited May 29, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
114.

Id.

115.

Id.

116.
117.

Id.
Id.

118.

Id.

119. Josephson Institute of Ethics, About Josephson Institute, http://josephsoninstitute.org/about.html
(last visited Sept. 7, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
120. Id.
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Josephson recognizes that religion and philosophy provide other avenues to
making ethical decisions. He calls the "most basic and useful ethical theory" the
do-unto-others standard from the Golden Rule. 2' But he recognizes that this
approach "falters in situations that involve a complex network of stakeholders
with conflicting interests,"'22 which essentially describes lobbying today. Another
approach is Kant's Categorical Imperative, which assumes that moral obligations
are absolute but embodies a rigidity that provides no help when we must select
between ethical values.'23 Finally, under the theory of Utilitarianism, "we should
judge the merit of an act by its foreseeable [and possibly unforeseen]
consequences," which often results in elevating
expediency over principle when,
2 4
on balance, the end justifies the means.1
Josephson offers his own approach, defining an ethical decision as a decision
that is consistent with his Six Pillars of Character: trustworthiness, respect,
25
responsibility, fairness, caring, and citizenship.
B. Susman's Guidelines
It is not that there is insufficient value in the very well thought-out and
refined frameworks for ethical decision-making described above. It is only that,
through the years, I have found that there are simpler tests for lobbyists to
employ when called upon to resolve many ethical challenges. These tests, like
those set out by Confucius, Aristotle, Kant, Hume, Kidder, Josephson, and
others, are likely to be reliable only where applied by a lobbyist with an informed
conscience. How do we attain an informed conscience? The process likely begins
in infancy, but as adults our conscience continues to be informed by laws, rules
and codes, peer pressures, ethics training, study of both history and contemporary
affairs, and thoughtful reflection on all of these.
I acknowledge that ethics tests provide no better guidance to sociopaths than
do ethics codes or, for that matter, laws. But most of us can apply them quicklyand reliably-in our day-to-day lobbying activities, as a supplement to those laws
and codes.
1.

Visceral Response

Our own gut reaction is often a highly reliable indicator that a potential
course of action is likely to be unethical. Over the years, in fielding calls from
lobbyists seeking my ethics advice as the ALL's Ethics Chair, I found that most
of the time the caller already felt uneasy about the conduct she was describing as

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

MICHAEL JOSEPHSON, MAKING ETHICAL DECISIONS 22 (2002).

Id.
Id. at24.
Id.
See generally JOSEPHSON, supra note 121.
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a possible course of action. I would often ask, "What does your gut tell you?"
And the response invariably corresponded with what my assessment, using
various and more complex analytical tools, would yield. It is not wrong, or a
waste of time, to seek external validation of a gut reaction. After all, it may
occasionally be difficult to distinguish one's crisis of conscience from a bad case
of indigestion. But for professional lobbyists who understand their trade and the
institutions with which they work, the visceral response can be a highly reliable
ethics indicator. The primal gut response is, of course, educated by experience
and informed by applicable objective ethical standards. But it also works beyond
rules and codes to fill their gaps.
2.

Washington Post Hoc Assessment

This test is certainly related to the visceral reaction, but it asks for an
imagined reaction: how do you think the conduct will look to you in retrospect
after it takes place? I refer to this test as the "Washington Post Hoc" assessment:
how would you feel (the visceral reaction, again) if you were to read about what
you were contemplating doing in The Washington Post? Would you want to
leave town on an extended vacation, or circulate the article to your family and
friends?
Speaking of family, one way to test this perspective involves "relative ethics"
of a different kind: Would your mother, spouse, or teenaged son be proud or
embarrassed if you told them what you had done? This calls for assessing a
vicarious visceral response, but the approach might be helpful when the gut does
not seem definitive enough.
While post hoc reasoning may be condemned in philosophical circles as a
fallacy, it nonetheless provides a construct for stepping back, gaining
perspective, and perhaps magnifying the reliability of the gut reaction.
3. Aspiration
Finally, a lobbyist might not feel guilty or self-conscious when
contemplating the questionable action and might not be able to project how a
family member would react. That could well be because the action seems so
well-accepted already: others are doing it and they seem comfortable; why
should I feel uncomfortable? Here we move from the visceral and emotional to
the intellectual. Everyone is doing it, but it ought to be wrong-and should be
changed.
My favorite example of an activity that fails this test is the commonplace
immersion of lobbyists in political campaigns through contributing, holding
fundraisers, bundling checks, chairing a candidate's finance committee, or
otherwise playing a significant role in a candidate's election effort. It is not
illegal. It violates no code of ethics. And it probably does not feel wrong to most
lobbyists-at least not inside the Capital Beltway-even when we read about it
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in the news. But to someone who aspires to remove the inevitable taint that
mixing money with lobbying brings to government-and perhaps to improve the
quality of government at the same time-public financing of congressional
campaigns will be seen as the aspirational alternative to our present campaign
finance system. It is possible that expanded public participation in campaign
financing, as happened in the last presidential race,'2 6 might take some pressure
off of special-interest financing, but the trend is not likely to percolate down to
Senate and House races in the near-term.
Short of public financing, I stand content to aspire to divorce lobbyists from
political campaigning. I believe it can be done constitutionally and should be
done to help restore public confidence in government and the reputations
of
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lobbyists as information-providers rather than special-interest favor-seekers.'
V. CONCLUSION

If lobbyists are legitimately to claim ours as a profession-an honorable one
at that-and to cloak our work in the flag of the First Amendment, then we must
act honorably and professionally. That means, of course, obeying applicable
laws. It means adhering to principles set out in relevant codes of conduct. But it
also means conducting ourselves ethically and being guided by whatever
subjective ethical tests are successful for us. It means taking actions that do not
give us heartburn, that we are proud to share with our families, that we look
forward to being reported in the press, and that we believe will best serve society
in the long run.

126. See generally OpenSecrets.org, Barack Obama, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/summary.php?
cycle=2008&cid=N00009638 (last visited June 13, 2009) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (providing
information on President Obama's campaign fundraising figures).
127. 1 proposed this aspirational goal in Thomas M. Susman, Private Ethics, Public Conduct: An Essay
on Ethical Lobbying, Campaign Contributions,Reciprocity, and the Public Good, 19 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv.
10, 19 (2008).

